In some cases, deliberate duplicity is argued, arguing that secret agreements or intentions were at odds with public agreements. One example is Winston Churchill`s secret agreement with the USSR that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the Baltic States. Faced with strategic demands to win the war, British Prime Minister Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had no choice but to accept the demands of their former ally, Soviet Prime Minister Joseph Stalin, at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, said retired American diplomat Charles G. Stefan.  The agreement called on the signatories to “consider together the measures necessary to fulfil the common responsibilities defined in this declaration.” During the discussions on Yalta, Molotov added language that weakens the implication of the application of the declaration.  Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met from 4 to 11 February in the city of Yalta, in Crimea, Russia, with their own agendas for the conference. For Stalin, the main objectives were post-war economic assistance to Russia and recognition by the United States and Great Britain of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
Churchill had the protection of the British Empire in the foreground, but he also wanted to clarify the status of post-war Germany. Roosevelt`s objectives were consensual on the creation of the United Nations and the obtaining of the Soviet agreement to go to war with Japan after Hitler`s defeat. None of them left Yalta fully satisfied. There has been no definitive determination of financial aid to Russia. Many questions concerning Germany have been postponed for further discussions. As for the United Nations, Stalin wanted to represent the 16 Soviet republics in the General Assembly, but settled for three (the Soviet Union as a whole, Belarus and Ukraine). The Soviets, however, agreed to join the war against Japan, 90 days after Hitler`s defeat in Germany. However, on the question of Poland`s post-war status, the hostility and mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would characterize the Cold War, was most evident.
Soviet troops already had control of Poland, a pro-communist provisional government had already been formed and Stalin insisted that Russia`s interests be recognized in that nation. The United States and Great Britain believed that the Polish government in exile, based in London, was the most representative of the Polish people. The final agreement called only for the formation of a government in Poland “broader than the public”. Free elections were called to determine Poland`s future for the future. Many U.S. officials were outraged by the agreement, which they said made Poland a communist future. Roosevelt felt however that there was nothing he could do at the moment, since the Soviet army occupied Poland. For the Allies, it is no secret to the Allies that General W.Adyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile based in London, had been, before his death in July 1943, the author and not Stalin`s concept of the concept of a Western displacement of Polish borders along a Oder-Neisse line to compensate for the renunciation of the eastern territories of Poland as part of a rapprochement of Poland with the USSR.  Sikorski`s special political advisor at the time, Jezef Retinger also agreed with the concept of Poland`s post-war borders reoriented, and Retinger wrote in his memoirs: “At the Tehran conference in November 1943, the big three agreed that Poland in the West should receive territorial compensation for the country it was losing to Russia. It was a good deal.  Churchill defended his action in Yalta during a three-day parliamentary debate that began on February 27 and ended with a vote of confidence.
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